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 Applying asymmetric key security to wireless sensor network (WSN) has 
been challenging task for the researcher of this field. One common trade-off 
is that asymmetric key architecture does provide good enough security than 
symmetric key but on the other hand, sensor network has some resource 
limitations to implement asymmetric key approach. Elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC) has significant advantages than other asymmetric key 
system like RSA, D-H etc. The most important feature of ECC is that it has 
much less bit requirement and at the same time, ensures better security 
compared to others. Hence, ECC can be a better option for implementing 
asymmetric key approach for sensor network. We propose a new 
cryptosystem which is based on Pseudo-inverse matrix and Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography. We establish a relationship between these two different 
concepts and evaluate our proposed system on the basis of the results of 
similar works as well as our own simulation done in TinyOS environment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
There was a believe that due to resource limitations, PKC is not feasible in WSN to ensure security. 
Some recent works on public key cryptography have shown reasonable performance on wireless sensor 
network. With the current generation sensor, asymmetric approach is feasible in terms of both software and 
hardware perspective. PKC like ECC is very much achievable on 8 bit energy constrained platforms 
(MICA2, MICA2DOT motes using Atmel Atmega128L). In [1], it is stated that D. Nikam and V. Raut 
utilized ECC and Enhanced Adaptive Acknowledgment (EAACK) to improve the security of MANETs. V. 
L. Shivraj et al. reviewed the suitability of onetime passwords for IoT devices then developed a scheme using 
identity based ECC and Lamport’s OTP algorithm. A. Dua et al. have proposed a scheme for secure smart 
city vehicle message communication. G. Sahebi et al. have designed a framework utilizing ECC for its fast 
speed, smaller keys, and greater security for E-health applications such as sensors and wearables. R. Fujdiak 
et al [2] has done analysis on 60 curves of different international standards and they emphasize on the 
importance of parameterization of ECC for performance issues. They showed that even 10-50 % execution 
time reduction can be possible on the prime field. We have seen the implementation of the Diffie-Hellman 
algorithm over EC on low power devices which is used in power grid and smart grid networks [3].  
Their method can be used for key distribution over public channel.  
As per our future predictions, ECC will play the leading role especially in wireless sensor network 
genre. By dint of the contribution of many researchers, we can now say that asymmetric key approach can be 
implemented in sensor network.There are many ideas presented earlier to implement asymmetric key in 
sensor network. Among those, a pseudo-inverse matrix based key handshaking scheme in asymmetric 
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manner for WSN, is proposed in [4]. The system mostly depends on TTP (Trusted Third Party) which is used 
to do major calculations. Their scheme is asserted to be more secure than Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
protocol and all the calculations are based on linear calculation. One year later in [5], Abedelaziz Mohaisen 
et al. raised an issue of security in that scheme since base station can be impersonated by any malicious entity 
and existence of TTP in WSN will be at high cost. In some cases, deployment of TTP seems to be 
challenging especially in hostile and adversarial environment.  
Our contribution in this paper are as follows: first, we propose a new asymmetric cryptosystem 
which is mainly based on ECC and pseudo-inverse matrix algorithm. In terms of initial setup, participating 
nodes have to have common EC settings as they need to choose random point on EC and derive line equation 
to get pseudo-inverse matrix. This leads us to set up a unique relation between ECC and pseudo-inverse 
matrix. Second, we eliminate any base node requirement in our design. Third, rather than working on plain 
text like [6], we emphasize on secure code used to encrypt the message. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Related Works – Preliminaries - Proposed System – 




2. RELATED WORKS 
Gupta et al [7] showed that ECC is not only feasible for sensor node but also enables the creation of 
a complete, secure web server stack that runs efficiently with very stringent resource constraints. Piotrowski 
et al [8] investigated four types of nodes; MICA2DOT, MICA2, MICAz, and TelosB, and estimated the 
power consumption for most common RSA and ECC operations. Roman and Alcaraz [9] discussed the 
applicability of public key infrastructures to wireless sensor networks and Ugus et. al. [10] implement elliptic 
curve and finite field arithmetic operations on a MICAz mote, which is a typical device employed in wireless 
sensor networks.Moreover, ECC has significant advantages over another popular PKC called RSA  
(Rivest-Shamir-Adleman). In [11], ECC-160 provides equivalent security to RSA-1024. Although,  
to emphasize on data security more, it is recommended to use ECC-224 which is equivalent to RSA-2048. 
RSA key generation requires generation of large prime numbers whereas ECC generates only random 




Before start giving details on our proposed system, we would like to give a brief description about 
the two concepts (Pseudo-inverse matrix and ECC) which are ultimately the basement of our concept. 
 
3.1.  Elliptic curve cryptography 
ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) has become promising public key cryptography which offers 
asymmetric approach along with smaller key size, bandwidth savings and faster in implementations while 
compared to the RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) cryptography. Integer factorization is the basement of the 
security of RSA. For simplified elliptic curve E defined over a finite prime field 𝐹𝑝 (𝑝 > 3) is given below: 
  
         𝑦2= 𝑥3+𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 mod 𝑝 where 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈  𝐹𝑝 and Discriminant, ∆=  −(4𝑎
3 + 27𝑏2)  ≠  0  
 
The discriminant must not be zero for an elliptic curve polynomial 𝑥³ + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 to possess three distinct 
roots. If discriminant is zero that would imply that two or more roots have coalesced, giving the curves in 
singular form. It is not safe to use singular curves for cryptography as they are easy to crack 
 
3.2.  Pseudo-inverse matrix 
For a given matrix 𝐴 ∈  ℝⁿ˟ᵐ and a matrix 𝐴ᵍ ∈  ℝᵐ˟ⁿ, 𝐴ᵍ is a generalized inverse of A if it 
satisfies the conditions are: 𝐴𝐴ᵍ𝐴 = 𝐴, 𝐴ᵍ𝐴𝐴ᵍ = 𝐴ᵍ, (AᵍA)*= AᵍA, (𝐴𝐴ᵍ)* = 𝐴𝐴ᵍ. It is also known as 
Moore-Penrose inverse [12]. If we have more rows than columns (𝑚 > 𝑛), then we have more equations than 
unknowns and the system is called over-determined linear system. Pseudo-inverse can be calculated as  
𝑨ᵍ =  (𝐴ᴛ𝐴)-1. 𝐴ᴛ. On the other hand, if columns are more than rows, then we have more unknowns than 
equations and the system is called under-determined linear system. Pseudo-inverse of this system can be 
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4. PROPOSED METHOD 
Our system emphasizes on secret code which is used to encrypt the message. We have applied 
pseudo-inverse algorithm, matrix mapping technique and EC encryption and decryption on randomly 
generated secret code rather than applying on whole message. First of all, we would like to notice that there 
is no head node or base station involved in this cryptosystem. Sender and receiver nodes are given a specific 
elliptic curve equation 𝑦² = 𝑥³ + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 mod 𝑝 where the order is prime and they will have a common 
generator point. We assume that they will have EC generated points based on that generator point. There will 
be a fixed nonsingular matrix and its inverse matrix. We also assume, all these pre-calculated parameters are 
accumulated in a security certificate. The certificate comes with a set of characters randomly mapped with 
those EC generated points for a certain period of time. Participating nodes in a specific network should be 





Figure 1. Block diagram of the proposed system 
 
 
4.1.  Setup process 
 Any sensor node wants to communicate with other node, has to initialize the connection using 
pseudo inverse algorithm. But in this case, choosing pseudo inverse matrix has to go through the below 
operation. Sender will choose over-determined linear system 𝑌 = 𝐴𝑋 where 𝐴 ∈  ℝⁿ˟ᵐ with 𝑚 > 𝑛 (rows 
greater than columns). On the other hand, receiver will choose under-determined linear system 𝑌 = 𝐴𝑋 
where 𝐴 ∈  ℝⁿ˟ᵐ with 𝑛 < 𝑚 (rows less than columns). Considering the dimension of 𝐴 matrix, both of 
them will pick random points from the EC generated points. In this case, number of random points should be 
double of the number of rows. They will draw lines on EC by connecting those random points and have their 
A matrix (which is ultimately coefficients of linear equation) finally. In both cases, A is not square matrix. 
Both sender and receiver will find their pseudo-inverse by (𝐴ᴛ𝐴)-1. 𝐴ᴛ and 𝐴ᴛ. (𝐴𝐴ᴛ)-1 respectively. 
 There is a bit different concept deployed to find out co-ordinate of 𝐴 matrix in the receiving end.  
To meet nxm dimension (number of columns greater than number of rows), affine coordinate point will be 
converted to projective coordinate point or homogeneous coordinate point [13]. Suppose, we will follow 
(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) instead of (𝑥, 𝑦). If we divide 𝑥 and 𝑦 coordinate value by 𝑧 in such a way that coordinate points 
remains unchanged. In this way, receiver will build under-determined system which is one of the basic 
requirements of having pseudo-inverse matrix. Finally, both of them will get a shared secret key 𝑋𝑌 in setup 
process. See the Figure 2 and Algorithm 1. 
 
4.2.  Generate secret code and find a secondary code matrix 
 Sender will choose a random secret code 𝐾 which length is n and each character of the secret code 
must exist in the character set of the certificate. It will first XOR and then encrypt the message 
(𝐸𝐾(𝐾 ⨁ 𝑀𝑆𝐺)) with this secret code. Then, it will send the encrypted MSG to receiver. Rather than sending 
the chosen code directly to receiver, sender will disguise the original code by doing some calculations.  
See the Algorithm 2. 
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Both parties have a set of generate EC points along with the character set and generator point  
on EC available for them. Mapped EC points for each character of secret code are 





Figure 2. Key handshaking technique based on Pseudo-inverse matrix 
 
 
If C be the random code matrix of length n, then generate a 3 × 𝑟 matrix where 𝑟 = 𝑛/3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠 = 2𝑛/3. 
 
                   




 Then, sender will do scalar multiplication (point doubling and adding) between code matrix and nonsingular 
3×3 matrix which is only integer matrix. Secondary code matrix is: 
 
 




It will get another set of points 𝑇 on EC; That is, 𝑻 =  [𝑄₁(𝑋₁, 𝑌₁), 𝑄₂(𝑋₂, 𝑌₂), 𝑃₃(𝑋₃, 𝑌₃), … …  𝑄ₙ (𝑋ₙ, 𝑌ₙ)]. 
 
Algorithm 1: Setup Process 
Input: EC parameters [a,b,prime], generator point P, generated    
            EC points 𝑝1, 𝑝2 … . . 𝑝𝑛  
Output: a shared key matrix XY 
 1: for i  1 to n do 
 2:       Assign 𝑝1, 𝑝2 … . . 𝑝𝑛 to Coorlist 
 3: end for 
 4: for i  1 to n do 
 5:      Apply randomization on Coorlist   output is a randomized  
          list of EC points for senderpointlist and receivepointlist 
 6: end for 
 7: Call line_fn(senderpointlist, receiverpointlist)  outputs are  
     Sender Matrix 𝑋𝐴 and Receiver Matrix 𝑌𝐴 
 8: if (𝑋𝐴 ≠ 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙) then  
 9:      call overdeterminedlinear(𝑋𝐴)  output is a sender pseudo- 
          inverse matrix 𝑋𝑔𝐴 
10: end if 
11: if (𝑌𝐴 ≠ 𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑙) then  
12:      call underdeterminedlinear(𝑌𝐴)  output is a receiver  
            pseudo-inverse matrix 𝑌𝑔𝐴 
13: end if 
14: Call pseudoinverse_algorithm (𝑋𝐴, 𝑌𝐴, 𝑋𝑔𝐴,𝑌𝑔𝐴)   output is a   
      Shared key matrix 𝑋𝑌 
 
 
C1      C2       C3       Cr 
Cr+1   Cr+2   Cr+3     Cs 
Cs+1   Cs+2   Cs+3     Cn 
Q1        Q2      Q3        Qr 
Qr+1   Qr+2    Qr+3      Qs 
Qs+1   Qs+2    Qs+3      Qn 
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Algorithm 2:  Generating secret code C and find a secondary code matrix 
Input: Generate a random secret code 𝐾, choose a message  
            MSG, Nonsingular matrix S  
Output: Q be a secondary code matrix  
1: E(MSG) = EK(K ⨁ MSG) and send it to receiver 
2: for i  1 to n do 
3:      Find the corresponding EC point on Coorlist for each  
         character of 𝐾  and build a code matrix  𝐶 
4: end for 
5: for i  1 to n do 
6:      Do EC scalar Multiplication between C and S   
         output is a secondary code matrix Q 
7: end for 
 
 
4.3.  Encrypt and decrypt secondary code matrix points 
 Let 𝐸 be an Elliptic Curve and 𝑃 be a generator point on the elliptic curve. 𝐺 is another Elliptic 
Curve point which is calculated as 𝑮 =  𝐷 ×  𝑃 where 𝐷 be a determinant of [Shared key matrix + Nonsingular 
Matrix].  
 
Secondary code encryption: 
Sender’s secret key = 𝑚                         Receiver’s secret key= 𝑛  
Sender’s public key = 𝑚𝐺                      Receiver’s public key = 𝑛𝐺 and send it to sender.  
Encrypted each point represented as [𝐸1, 𝐸2 −  𝐸𝑛] where 𝐸1 = 𝑚𝐺 and 𝐸2 = 𝑄1 + 𝑚(𝑛𝐺) and calculate  
other 𝐸3 −  𝐸𝑛  in the same way and send those to receiver at a time.  
Secondary code decryption:  
Decrypted point, 𝐷𝑝 =  𝐸2 –  𝑛. 𝐸1  =  𝑄1 + 𝑚. (𝑛𝐺) –  𝑛. (𝑚𝐺) =  𝑄1 + 𝑚. (𝑛𝐺) –  𝑚. (𝑛𝐺) =  𝑄1 
Receiver will decrypt other cipher text 𝐸3 −  𝐸𝑛. Algorithm 3 is implemented for this step. 
 
4.4.  Find the secret code and decrypt the message 
 After getting decrypted point, receiver needs to extract the secret code by which message was 
encrypted. As we mentioned earlier, both of them have 3 × 3 non-singular matrix 𝑆 and its inverse 𝑆-1.  
So, it will do EC scalar multiplication to find the actual secret code, 𝑪 = 𝑆-1 × 𝑄 
As all the EC points of C are mapped with a character (as per the certificate), so receiver can easily 
decrypt and un-XOR the message MSG with secret code. Step 4 is described in the Algorithm 4. 
 
Algorithm 3: Encrypt and decrypt secondary code matrix points. 
Input: a shared key matrix XY, nonsingular matrix S, Generator point P,  
            sendersecret, receiversecret, secondary code matrix Q 
Output:  Ep be the encrypted points, Dp be the decrypted points 
 1: for i  1 to n do 
 2:        Do addition between XY and S  output is a another matrix Z 
 3: end for 
 4: Call determinant(Z)  output is a integer value D  
 5: if ( 𝐷 ≠ 0) then  
 6:        Do EC point multiplication between D and P  output is a EC point G 
 7: end if  
 8: if (G ≠ null) then 
 9:       Do EC point multiplication between G and sendersecret, G and  
            receiversecret  outputs are senderpublickey, receiverpublickey  
10: end if 
11: for r  1 to Q.Count do     // sender side encryption 
12:       Call  ECPoint(Q[r].Xcoordinate,Q[r].Ycoordinate)    
             output is a EC point E1    
13:       Do EC point multiplication between sendersecret and receiverpublickey   
             output is a EC point E2   
14:       Do EC addition between E1 and E2  output is a encrypted point Ep  
15: end for    
16: for t  1 to Ep.Count do     // receiver side decryption 
17:        Call ECPoint(Ep[t].Xcoordinate,Ep[t].Ycoordinate)   
             output is a EC point E1    
18:        Do EC point multiplication between receiversecret and senderpublickey   
             output is a EC point E2 
19:        Do EC addition between E1 and  ECPoint(E2.Xcoordinate,-E2.Ycoordinate)            
              output is a decrypted point Dp 
20: end for 
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Algorithm 4: Find the secret code and decrypt the message. 
Input: decrypted points  Dp , Inverse of  
            nonsingular matrix  𝑆-1 
Output: Secret code matrix C, Secret code  
               K, message MSG 
1: for i  1 to n do 
2:      Call ECPoint(Dp[i].xcoordinate,                                         
          Dp[i].ycoordinate)  output is a EC  
          point E1  
3:      Do EC scalar Multiplication between  
          E1 and  𝑆-1  output is a secret code    
          matrix C 
4: end for 
5: for i  1 to n do 
6:      find the corresponding character as per  
         the points of C. // secret code K 
7: end for 
8: Call decrypt_XOR(K, MSG)  output is  
    a message MSG 
 
 
5. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CRYPTOSYSTEM 
We start with the sample Elliptic curve 𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑥 + 13 mod 59 and it has 67 points including ∞. 
Generator point is (1, 29). 
 
 
We have 3 × 3 nonsingular matrix 𝑆 =                        and Inverse of such matrix S-1 =       
 
 
In the initital step, both sender and receiver will choose random EC points in such a way that over 
determined and under determined linear system can be made respectively. On the basis of those linear 
system, they will find out pseudo-inverse matrix and ultimately shared secret key matrix using  
pseudo-inverse matrix algorithm. The algorithm is given in [4]. A per Figure 3, 
 
                              
                             Sender Matrix 𝑿A:                                  Receiver Matrix 𝒀A: 
 
 
Note: For receiving end, affine (𝑋, 𝑌) coordinate is transformed into projective coordinate (𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑍) point in 
which all the points are divided by 𝑧 (which is 1) so that original coordinate point remains same. So, sender 
and receiver both have 𝑋𝐴 and 𝑌𝐴 respectively. They can find their pseudo-inverse 𝑋𝑔𝐴 and 𝑌𝑔𝐴 matrix 
respectively and do the rest of the calculations according to the pseudo-inverse matrix algorithm to establish 





Figure 3. Draw lines on EC y2 = x3 + x + 13 mod 59 
1   1   1 
1   2   2 
1   2   3 
 
2   -1   0 
-1   2   -1 
0   -1   1 
 
-15   26  
-17 23
-13   16 
-10  26   1 
-14  26   1 
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In the second step, sender generates a random secret code “Aub#en!cr”. The message is first xored 
and then encrypted with that random secret code and sent to the receiver. Each character of the secret code 
must exist in the certificate. EC generated points are randomly mapped with the character set. Suppose, for 
our secret code, mapped EC points for each character are: A = 38P = (4,9), u= 26P = (48,21), b = 35P = (5,5), 


























Let 𝐷 be the determinant of matrix Z. So, 𝑫 = 12258. If generator point 𝑃 is (1, 29), then we can calculate 
another point 𝑮 =  𝐷 × 𝑃 = 12258 ×  (1, 29)  =  (10, 43). 
Sender’s secret key = 𝑚 =  11, Sender’s public key = 𝑚𝐺 =  11 ×  (10, 43)  = (22, 57)  
Receiver’s secret key = 𝑛 = 7, Receiver’s public key = 𝑛𝐺 = 7 ×  (10, 43)  = (55, 57) and send it to sender. 
Encrypted each point represented as [𝐸1, 𝐸2 −  𝐸10] where 𝐸1 = 𝑚𝐺 =  (22,57)   
𝐸2 = 𝑄1 + 𝑚(𝑛𝐺)  =  (52,28)  +  11(7(10,43)) =  (52,28)  +  (44,35)  =  (20,3).  
Sender will calculate other encrypted points from 𝐸3 – 𝐸10  similarly and send those to receiver at a time.  
Decrypted points are calculated at receiver side. 
𝐷𝑝 =  𝐸2 –  𝑛. 𝐸1   = (20,3) + (44, −35) = (52,28) =  𝑄1. Receiver will find out other points 𝑄2 –  𝑄9 by 
decrypting cipher text 𝐸3 –  𝐸10. 
 In this final step, receiver needs to do only EC scalar multiplication between secondary code matrix 
Q and inverse of the nonsingular matrix 𝑆.    
  
           
              




At last, receiver can decrypt and un-XOR the message with the secret code 𝐶. 
 
 
6. PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION 
  We would like to do performance analysis and evaluation in terms of energy cost of computation 
and communication, speed and memory consumption. We take reference from other papers to do our analysis 
and evaluate our system. Our first reference is [4] which entails pseudo-inverse matrix to develop a key 
handshaking scheme between participating nodes. To make it truly asymmetric, we have involved elliptic 
curve cryptography which is popular for WSN. We develop a pseudo-inverse matrix by choosing random 
points from the generated EC points. Putting those points into line equation and deriving pseudo-inverse 
(4,9)      (48,21)     (5,5) 
(4,50)    (46,35)     (38,42) 
(52,28)  (23,7)       (14,23) 
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-214    286    11 
-152 156 6
-94        78     3 
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-1   2   -1 
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matrix are very simple algebraic calculations and it will take negligible amount of time and cost. As per their 
analysis, number of bits transmitted during key handshaking process is 𝑛(2𝑛 + 𝑘 + 𝑚). These calculations 
are also linear. 
 
6.1. Energy analysis 
 We assume that a certificate will consist of the elliptic curve and its generated points along with 
mapped character set, a generator point or primitive point or base point, nonsingular matrix and its inverse 
matrix. We believe that it will save a lot of energy. An experiment [14] conducted on Mica2Dot (Atmel 
ATmega128L 8-bit microcontroller) showed that energy cost of computation is much less than data 
transmission. Unit cost of transmitting and receiving one packet consisting of 41 byte are 2.9 mJ and 1.4 mJ 
respectively. Figure 4 gives us a comparison between various PKC based handshake schemes. In terms of 
transmitting and receiving during key handshake scheme, simplified SSL consumes much energy than others 
due to the amount of exchanged data. Total energy cost of our sender and receiver node are respectively 





Figure 4. Comparing energy consumption for PKC schemes 
 
 
In Micro PKI, the scheme can consume a lot of energy if the base node is far from the participating 
sensors since packets are sent over multihop link. Unlike [4], absence of base node also reduces the cost of 
energy consumption as both the pairing nodes initiate their communication by themselves. Rest of the 
transmission are happened in other steps where sender and receiver need 1 transmit and 1 receive  
(cost 4.3 mJ) respectively in the step 2. In step 3, 1 transmit and 1 receive are needed by both the sensor 
nodes (cost 8.6 mJ). Hence, if we consider step by step process, enegy cost of our system is much reasonable 
for the sensor node.   
Giacomo et al [16] demonstrates the energy cost of two sensors named MICAz and TelosB in terms 
of computation, transmit, receive, listen and sleep. Using the same settings, we would like to compare three 
differnet key agreement protocols in the MICAz and TelosB sensor respectively. In this case, we have 
considered only transmit and receive. Comparison is given in the Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1. MicaZ and TelosB-Energy consumption during transmission and reception 
Protocols Process MicaZ (mJ) TelosB (mJ) 
Kerberos Send 0.9 1.1 
Kerberos Receive 1.1 1.3 
Proposed key handshake Send 0.71 0.85 
Proposed key handshake Receive 0.79 0.95 
ECDH-ECDSA Send 1.3 1.6 
ECDH-ECDSA Receive 1.5 1.8 
 
 
It is clearly seen that energy cost of our EC-Pseudoinverse based key handshake scheme is less than 
others. Kerberos [17] uses Trusted Third Party which leads the protocol to increase the number of 
calculations, transmisions and receptions. In our case, no TTP or base node is used. On the other hand, 
Int J Elec & Comp Eng  ISSN: 2088-8708  
 
Elliptic curve and pseudo-inverse matrix based cryptosystem for wireless sensor networks (Shomen Deb) 
4487 
ECDH-ECDSA does not involve TTP, instead Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm is used for 
authentication purpose. Overall cost of that protocol is higher than others due to its longer calculation. 
Although, we are using EC concept into our system, but in the initial connection setup or key hand shaking 
process, two things are improving our performance. First, most of the parameters are precalculated. Second, 
expensive point multiplications are not done in this step.  
If we had sensor, we could have estimated the cost of computation by measuring the timing 
performance (mJ/Tclk) of the implementation on the sensor node. We believe that Step 1 (Key handshaking) 
does not consume much energy since randomly choosing EC points and consequently, deriving line 
equations and pseudoinverse matrix are all linear operations. As per [14], energy cost of RSA-1024 and 
ECC-160 based handshake are approximately 390 mJ and 93 mJ. Considering our given example, we want to 
calculate computation cost [16] in terms of ECC-160 scalar multiplications. Experimental data is given in the 
Table 2. Encryption on MICAz in Step 2 consumes much energy than that of TelosB. For TelosB, energy 
consumption in other steps is much less than RSA-1024 handshake. Although it depends on the nonsingular 
matrix and the code matrix. Qty refers to the number of point multiplication. 
 
 
Table 2.  Energy consumption while doing point multiplication for MicaZ and TelosB 
 Sender Receiver 
Process MICAz TelosB MICAz TelosB 




















Step 1: 0 55 0 0 17 0 0 55 0 0 17 0 
Step 2: 12 55 660 12 17 204 0 55 0 0 17 0 
Step 3: 3 55 165 3 17 51 0 55 0 0 17 0 
Step 4: 0 55 0 0 17 0 7 55 385 7 17 119 
Total Cost: 825  255  385  119 
 
 
Compared to the pseudo-inverse based handshake, energy cost of transmitting and receiving for 
RSA-1024 based SSL handshake is much higher because of its longer key sizes. In our case, for integer data 
type and 3×3 matrix, 108 bytes of payload is transmitted by both sender and receiver whereas with SSL 
handshake based on ECC-160, both parties need to transmit almost double of the payload of pseudo-inverse 





Figure 5. Amount of data transmitted during handshake 
 
 
6.2. Speed and Memory Consumption 
Due to longer key size of RSA or other public key scheme, ECC has much lower execution time and 
memory requirements. Nils Gura et al [18] shows that ECC-160 takes only 0.81s with 282 bytes of data 
memory whereas RSA-1024 private key modular exponentiation takes nearly 11s with 930 bytes of data 
memory.  Moreover, ECC-224 (2.19s, 422 bytes data) is equivalent to RSA-2048 (83.26s, 1853 bytes data). 
For our given example, sender needs 12 point multiplications in step 2, 3 point multiplications in step 3 and 
receiver needs 7 point multiplications in step 4. In this case, we consider EC curve secp160r1 and secp224r1 
for point multiplication along with the equivalent RSA-1024 and RSA-2048 private key modular 
exponentiation. 
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In Figure 6, both the comparisons have been done between the number of EC multiplications 
through the steps and two RSA private key modular exponentiation. Even we do number of EC operations, 
time cost is still less than RSA operation. If we would have done such amount of RSA operations as the 
number of EC multiplications in our steps, memory cost would be far higher than memory consumption of 
EC based system.It clearly shows us that ECC has great advantages over RSA in terms of time and memory.  
 To evaluate the speed of our proposed cryptosystem, we have developed a program which is built 
using python 2.7. We have used different configuration CPU and The Prime Pages Library. In this case, we 
have changed only prime value to check our result and taken a random secret code of length 9 as per our 












Figure 6. RSA private key modular exponentiation versus EC point multiplication, 
(a) comparing memory requirement, (b) comparing time requirement 
 
 
Table 3. Proposed system running on different CPU 
Prime 
Number 
OS: Ubuntu 14.04 
Quad Core, 4 GB 
OS: Windows 10 
Core 2 Duo, 1 GB 
OS: Windows 7 
Quad Core, 256 MB 
 R.T. P.G.T. En/De R.T. P.G.T. En/De R.T. P.G.T. En/De 
P=10691 0.02 1.5 0.007/0.0007 0.17 2.78 0.015/0.00138 0.09 1.88 0.010/0.001 
P=56333 0.15 38.29 0.009/0.001 0.66 73.32 0.02/0.0032 0.58 40.9 0.016/0.0017 
P=130199 0.32 200 0.015/0.002 0.97 400.99 0.03/0.005 0.93 294.55 0.02/0.003 
P=150193 0.62 945 0.02/0.0033 1.1 1202.56 0.05/0.009 0.98 1188.42 0.02/0.004 
P=599983 1.35 1735 0.045/0.013 2.15 2515.43 0.08/0.024 1.87 2812.36 0.05/0.017 
R.T. = Running Time, P.G.T.= Point Generation Time, En/De= Encryption Time / Decryption Time 
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We calculate the estimated time cost of each step separately. We have found that for even large 
prime value, encryption/decryption time cost remains very negligible and total running time is very much 
reasonable. Sample data shows that most of the time is consumed for calculating point generation and is 
increased as per the prime value size. Since our assumption is to have certificate consisting of generated 
points on the curve, So we can easily ignore this time required for point generation. Total running time is 
distributed among calculating pseudo-inverse matrix based algorithm, random code generation  
(In our example, code length is 9) along with scalar multiplication with nonsingular matrix, secondary code 
encrytion/decryption and extracting original code using inverse of nonsingular matrix. Hence, the longer the 
code is, the longer execution time and memory are required. There is a trade-off between code size and 
sensor’s resource limitations. 
 To calculate time to transmit data, we develop a nesc program in TinyOS 2.1.2 and debugged the 
program with python interface. For this simulation, we create a data file containing the nodes connected and 
the gain value. We observe that it takes 0.282 s – 0.46 s to transmit one packet which consists of matrix value 
or public key or encrypted EC points. Simulation data is given in the Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4. Simulating packet transmission in TinyOS environment 
 Transmission 
Process Sender Receiver 
 Qty. Unit Time in Sec. Total Time in Sec. Qty. Unit Time in Sec Total Time in Sec. 
Step 1: 2 0.46 0.92 1 0.46 0.46 
Step 2: 1 0.46 0.46 0 0.46 0 
Step 3: 1 0.46 0.46 1 0.46 0.46 
Step 4: 0 0.46 0 0 0.46 0 
Total:  1.84  0.92 
 
 
6.3.   Optimization 
Our first observation for improvement is that since our implementation is focused on the curve over 
prime field, domain parameters of specific curve plays a significant role to increase computation speed.  
As per R. Fujdiak et al. [19], we can have fastest curve and slowest curve within the same group.  
They showed that having changes in parameters will have effect on speed upto 50%. As an example, the 
curve wtls9-160 bits has CPU cycles 277533 which is almost 50% increase of the CPU cycles (184404) of  
wtls7-160 bits. So, choosing right curve with right domain parameters results in increased speed as well as 
reduced in memory requirements. 
Second observation is that ECC operations (both addition and doubling) need a field inversion and 
multiple multiplications. It is known that inversion is considerably expensive than multiplication. Hence, it is 
advantageous to adopt projective coordinates rather than affine coordinates to avoid inversion operations.  
We can consider various types of projective coordinates such as standard projective coordinates, Jacobian 
projective coordinates, chudnovsky coordinates and mixed Jacobian-affine coordinates. Among those 
projective coordinates, Jacobian coordinates has fastest point doubling and Jacobian-affine coordinates has 
fastest point adding as per the book written by D. Hankerson et al. [11]. If the point is fixed and storage is 
available, then pre-computation on some data 2𝑃, 22𝑃 … . . 2𝑡−1𝑃 will eliminate all doublings and results in 
accelerated point multiplication consequently. 
Third observation for the betterment of this cryptosystem is that there are numerous method to 
calculate scalar multiplication which is 𝑘 times addition of a point 𝑃. So, it can be written as 
 
𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 = 𝑃 + 𝑃 + 𝑃 + ⋯ + 𝑃 
 
Where k is a positive integer and 𝑃, 𝑄 are elliptic curve points. Target is to reduce the number of these 
additions that will make scalar multiplication faster and more efficient. In this case, basic method used in this 
purpose is called binary method. This method scan every bits of 𝑘 and its performance depends on the type 
representation of 𝑘. There are some other methods such as Non-Adjacent Form (NAF) proposed by  
Booth [20], generalization of NAF method called w-NAF, Direct Recording by Pathak and Sanghi [21] in 
2010, Mutual Opposite Form (MOF) by Okeya et al [22] etc. More than 77% of the total execution time on 
the ATmega128 are spent on multiplications and squarings for point multiplication over secp160r1. 
Nils Gura et al [18] proposed a hybrid multiplication strategy which improves the performance for ECC point 
multiplication upto 24.8% for sec160r1 and 25% for secp224r1 on the ATmega128 8-bit microcontroller. 
As per assumption, we have considered nonsingular matrix, inverse of its matrix, generated EC 
points along with character set to be included into the security certificate. All the sensor nodes will have a 
security certificate to validate or authenticate themselves before joining in the transmission. Most of the 
                ISSN: 2088-8708 
Int J Elec & Comp Eng, Vol. 9, No. 5, October 2019 :  4479 - 4492 
4490 
parameters are calculated and fixed in advance. We have done little bit change in encryption process. Rather 
than sending encrypted text one by one, we have sent all the encrypted text (𝐸2— 𝐸n) at a time. That reduces 
the significant amount of computation and transmission cost. Number of operations such as EC addition, 
doubling or multiplication depend on nonsingular matrix and its inverse matrix. Presence of nonsingular 
matrix enables us to disguise the original secret code which is used to encrypt the message. Unlike other 
research works, most of the computations & transmission are done on the secret code rather than whole plain 
text. Higher code length will ensure higher security. We can optimize cost of EC calculation by considering 
various projective co-ordinate system and methods [23] to avoid expensive inversion operation or to reduce 
the number of multiplication. 
 
 
7. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we will analyse each step of our proposed system in terms of security issues. In the 
first step, there doesn’t exist any base node, then there is no question of being compromised with others.  
For every transmission, both will choose their EC points randomly and will form their linear system to build 
pseudo-inverse matrix. They can find a new shared key in every transaction or after a certain period of time. 
So, first step is very much secure. 
In the second step, only sender initiates or generates a secret code. Original message or plain text is 
xored and encrypted with this code. This code is totally disguised by multiplying nonsingular matrix and 
code matrix. Since, secret code only belongs to sender, so this step is also secure. 
In the third step, we have chosen an EC function which order is prime, then any point except zero 
point will be a generator. All points form a cyclic group. Moreover, we will have another point 𝐺 (𝐺 =  𝐷 ×
𝑃) to get involved into secondary code encryption. As we said, shared secret key was generated from random 
linear system by choosing random points on EC. On the other hand, nonsingular matrix is a common 
parameter for both the parties involved into transmission. If we do analysis encryption and decryption 
process, we will find following observation: 
a. If an adversary finds the public key of sender and receiver, he cannot be able find out secret key. 
Because it is elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem over a finite field. 
b. If a hacker finds encrypted points 𝐸1, 𝐸2  where 𝐸1 = 𝑚𝐺 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸2 = 𝑄 + 𝑚(𝑛𝐺). Solving this two 
cipher text will require to solve DLP. 
c. At the decryption side, if attacker wants to calculate 𝐷 =  𝐸2 –  𝑛. 𝐸1, then he needs to calculate 
𝐸1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸2 first which is stated earlier that it’s a DLP. 
As stated in [24], finding #𝐸(𝐹𝑞) exactly is computationally difficult when a large prime factor is involved. 
All EC points rely on the hardness of the ECDLP. If the EC is chosen carefully, the best known algorithm 
(Exponential time algorithm) for computing the ECDLP requires ≈ √𝑃 steps. Ex: 𝑃 ≈  2160, attacker 
requires √𝑃 ≈ √2160 =  2160/2 =  280 steps.So, if we work with ECC-160, this step becomes safe and secure. 
Even ECC-224 or ECC-256 will make this step strong enough. 
The final step requires scalar multiplication between inverse of nonsingular matrix and decrypted 
points matrix Q to find out original code which was used to encrypt original message/plain text. Ultimately,  




In our proposed system, we have tried to limit almost all the calculations to be performed on secure 
code which enables a sender to reduce running time, energy consumption, expensive calculations etc.  
Even for a large message, system will only concentrate on secure code and that makes the system simple and 
protected. In one hand, there is a unique concept introduced in which a relation between pseudo-inverse 
matrix and elliptic curve has been established using random linear system and consequently, we get random 
shared key in every transactions. On the other hand, we understand that there are some expensive EC 
computations involved into the proposed system. Since some crucial parameters are calculated in advance 
before initiating any transactions, so we are hopeful that our proposed cryptosystem will be realistic for 
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